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Intro
The ultimate constituents of the universe are abstract. Just as traditional machine
functionalism in Philosophy of Mind reduces mental states to a Turing machine
completely describable in physical terms, the same sorts of arguments show that physical
objects are reducible to a Turing machine originating in abstracta. Such a deeper level
reduction is warranted by Ockham’s Razor, the guiding principle in ontology.
To show this, it is important to begin by presenting the traditional problem of
ontology and why it remains an important issue in metaphysics. I also show that other
important philosophers have defended ontologies of abstracta and justify the use of
Ockham’s Razor as a guiding ontological principle.
Next, I explain the difference between abstract and concrete entities, endorsing
and developing a view developed by Nelson Goodman in The Structure of Appearance,
arguing that his view is superior to the accounts of abstracta offered by philosophers such
as David Lewis, David Efrid, and Tom Stoneham.
Then, I show how traditional machine-state functionalism operates in Philosophy
of Mind. This is a crucial part of my thesis since I apply the same sort of reduction to a
deeper level of ontology.
Finally, I show how the arguments that reduce mental states to functions of brain
properties can be abstracted out of Philosophy of Mind to reduce physical objects to
functions of abstracta. I conclude by considering and replying to a potential objection to
my view.

Farlow 2
Basic Problem of Ontology
Ultimately, this paper is an explanation and argument for my ontology. In
the following section, I will first discuss what kinds of problems are studied in ontology.
Then, I will discuss what kinds of measurements we have to judge whether or not an
ontology worth maintaining as true. Finally, I will put my project in the scope of the
problem and discuss why ontology matters at all.
My saying that the ultimate constituents of the universe are abstract is an
attempt at solving the most basic problem in ontology. But, what question am I answering
when I say this? Philosopher W.V.O Quine states the problem saying that the question
can simply be put “What is there?” And, Quine states that the obvious answer to this is
“Everything.” But, this answer is not satisfactory. Of course, all there is is all there is, but
this does not tell us anything about what exists other than that it does exist. So, the real
issue is the nature of what exists. To answer the question of ontology, we must identify
the constituents of reality and posit their nature.1 To apply this to my Project, I am
arguing that what is entirely abstract. And, that these abstract things are the originators of
a function that result in a seeming physical universe.
Of course, there are many different answers to this question. But, not all answers
are equally satisfactory. I could answer the question “What is there?” in a near-infinite
number of ways. I could say something like, “The ultimate constituents of the universe
are frogs and God and ideas.” What would make this statement any better or worse than

1

Quine, Willard V. "On What There Is." The Review of Metaphysics 2, no. 5 (1948): 21-38. Accessed
February 16, 2021. http://www.jstor.org/stable/20123117.
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other ideas of the things that make up reality? In short, philosophers use Ockham’s Razor
to evaluate ontological claims. Generally, a slightly modified version is used that states,
“Do not multiply types of entities beyond necessity.” In other words, any ontology that
has an unnecessary type of entity2 is less preferable than an ontology that does not have
unnecessary types of things. And, in an attempt to be as efficient as possible,
philosophers must try to rid their ontology of unnecessary types of entities wherever
possible.
Additionally, Bertrand Russell has his own version of Ockham’s Razor. He states,
“Wherever possible, logical constructions are to be substituted for inferred entities.”3
Essentially, Ontological categories should not be inferred without sufficient evidence. I
intend for my ontological reductions to act to show a lack of sufficient evidence for the
existence of physical objects.
Ultimately, I am seeking efficiency in the way in which I explain the world.
Another, possibly more helpful, way to phrase the problem of ontology is, “How can I
explain everything I see in reality with as few necessary components as possible?” I am
choosing to do this through monism, the idea that there is only one ultimate constituent of
reality. Insofar as I am correct, that is to say if reality can be wholly explained with just
the existence of one type of entity, this would be considered efficient according to
Ockham’s’ Razor. Furthermore, this is a monism via logical reduction. According to

2

A type of entity generally refers to its ontological type. Some examples are physical things, abstract
things, God etc.…
3
Russell, B. (n.d.). The Relation of Sense-Data to Physics. In Mysticism and Logic and Other Essays (pp.
155-156). George Allen and Unwin.
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Russell, logical reductions should be treated as ontological reductions. Because, insofar
as the logical reductions are valid, they can be an explanation of reality. So, the type of
efficiency I am looking for is efficiency of types of entity and efficiency of constructions
of entities. In other words, how can I use the least number of entities to logically explain
reality. From there, we can apply that efficiency to ontology.
A natural reaction to this from someone not previously invested in philosophy
might be, “Why does this matter? What does the problem of ontology have to do with my
life? I do not need a solution to the problem of ontology because the problem of ontology
has caused no suffering, discomfort, anxiety, death, etc. in my life.” To this I would
reply, everything in your life has ontological presuppositions. For example, if you are
theist, you probably believe in a God that is unlike physical things and unlike abstract
things. Which means, there is a different type of entity, possibly in addition to others that
you believe in, that Ockham says must be necessary. Your beliefs in God, and therefore
religion, are beholden to ontology. Engaging with the problem of Ontology is engaging
with your everyday beliefs. And, as a result the problem of ontology can force you to
reevaluate beliefs you may have considered mundane or unproblematic previously. The
problem of ontology matters because insofar as you do not want to be deceived or
incorrect in your daily beliefs, you must tackle the presuppositions of those beliefs, which
is the problem of ontology.
Addressing the Weird Factor
Questions of ontology and ontologies that deny the conventional nature of
physical objects can seem very strange. So, before arguing for my ontology I would like
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to discuss the strangeness of such beliefs. I intend to show that there are many incredibly
intelligent historical figures that have held abstract views of reality. Furthermore, I will
argue that no matter how strange a view, the strangeness does not dictate the truth value
of the argument. And, finally I would like to explain the difference between pragmatic
living and ontological questioning.
To those who have never studied ontology, it may seem strange and a little
fanatical to think or even care that reality is not physical, but rather abstract. But, I assure
you I am in good company. Plato, for example, thinks that abstract forms are the ultimate
things of our reality. And, that physical objects are just kinds of representations of their
abstract counterparts. Spinoza believed that reality was really just a part of God’s mind.
And, therefore, everything we see in the world around us is not actually physical but part
of God. The reason I bring this up is to show that ontologies that fundamentally deny the
existence of physical things or posit non-physical things as the ultimate pieces of reality
have a prestigious history. That is not to say that Plato, Spinoza, and I have similar views,
but rather that abstract ontologies have a prestigious and intelligent history. It may be
strange, but views like mine have been well-argued and well-received historically.
It is also important to note that however strange a view is, the truth value of that
view is not affected by the strangeness. I do not think my views are strange in particular.
But, if you disregard the academic past and reasonable conclusions that philosophers of
the past have, you still might be inclined to say that my view is strange. But regardless of
how strange you may think my view is, it still stands on its logical consistency. It seems
to me to be a circularity to assume that an argument is invalid based on its strangeness. If
one were to say, “This argument is incredibly weird. Therefore, I will not believe it.”
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They would be using their conclusions about reality to make a statement about the way in
which reality is. So, I would encourage the reader to take my arguments at their
reasonable value rather than any manufactured value based on the strangeness of my idea.
Additionally, there is no need to pragmatically apply this view to your everyday
life. I am not treating or thinking of the computer I am typing this on as anything
different than the physical object I perceive it as. There is a separation between living my
everyday life and writing a philosophical paper. I can truly believe that the foundations of
our world are abstract while practically living as if physical things are as they seem. The
way in which I perceive the world and the way in which things are are allowed to be
different. I am placing no moral worth on living as if things are not what they seem. For
example, it is perfectly reasonable to believe that a brick wall is reducible to abstracta all
the while not wanting to walk into it for fear of hurting my head.
Defining Abstracta
To begin discussing the abstract ontology itself, it is important that we first define
abstracta. In the following section, I will discuss three definitions relating to abstracta and
concretum, explain the importance of a positive definition of abstracta, discuss why I will
be using the criteria I am using, and discuss the criteria for abstractness that I am using in
the context of the other views discussed.
The first definition I will be discussing comes from The Subtraction Argument for
Metaphysical Nihilism. The criteria for concreteness as stated by Efrid and Stoneham
are, a). concrete objects must exist at locations in spacetime, and b). These concrete
objects must have intrinsic qualities. In other words, in order for an object to be physical
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it has extension in space and properties that come from the nature of the thing itself.4 For
example, a brick is located spatiotemporally and has the property of being rough in
texture. So, according to Efrid and Stoneham, the brick is physical. It is important to note,
that Efrid and Stoneham do not say that the absence of a location in spacetime and
extrinsic properties make something abstract. This a definition purely concerned with
concrete objects.
Nelson Goodman writes that changes in appearance are not changes in matter
necessarily. Concrete objects persist through changes in time and appearance. The actual
properties of concrete things are different from the appearance of concrete things. And, in
being different, the properties of concrete objects are not affected by how we perceive
them. He defines a concrete object as one that can be exhaustively broken into concrete
parts. For example, a car can be broken down into smaller and smaller concrete parts
until all of its atoms are accounted for. And, Abstracta are things with no concrete parts.
Goodman makes room for objects that are neither concrete nor abstract, however. He
states that one example would be the sum of a concretum and a color it does not contain.
This is very vague as Goodman only has one small paragraph describing one example. I
interpret it as, all of the instances of a certain physical object and a color that those
instances do not contain. I have a hard time listing an example of this and Goodman
seems to as well as he has not provided any. The closest thing to an example I can think
of is all of the instances of stoplights and the color pink. Stoplights are concrete things,
but instances of pink colored stoplights do not exist. With that being said, a pink stoplight

Efird, David, and Tom Stoneham. “The Subtraction Argument for Metaphysical Nihilism.” Journal of
Philosophy 102, no. 6 (2005): 303–25. https://doi.org/10.5840/jphil2005102614.
4
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could easily be created. It just seems to be a non-existent but logically consistent physical
thing. Additionally, Goodman brings up the issue of chains of primitive predicates. If we
say that, object ‘A’ is lumpy and round; object ‘B’ is smooth and round; and Object ‘C’ is
smooth and square. We can create a set based on similar properties where ‘A’ and ‘C’
have no relation. If it is the case that entities in the same sets can have no similar
properties, then sets cannot be organized based on properties. This poses a problem for
the epistemology of set theory. If a set, which is commonly viewed as abstract, can
contain things with no related properties while being organized by properties, can they
serve as the building blocks for ontology?5
David Lewis also writes on the distinction between abstract and concrete. He
states that abstract and concrete entities are certainly different. And, listing examples of
concrete objects and abstracta do nothing to help us discover what they are. He states, to
some extent, his modal realist versions of possible worlds are at least partly concrete
because objects in one possible world have exact duplicates in others. He then gives us
three possible ways to look at the concrete/abstract distinction. 1). Concrete things are
things like bricks while abstract things are things like numbers. 2). The distinction
between concrete and abstract is just the distinction between particulars and universals.
3). Abstract entities are not spatiotemporally located and cannot enter causal
relationships.6

5

Goodman, N. (1977). Concreta and Qualification. In The Structure of Appearance (pp. 156-177). Boston,
USA: D. Reidel Publishing Company.
6

Lewis, D. K. (1986). Concreteness. In On the Plurality of Worlds (pp. 81-86). Oxford: Oxford: Blackwell.
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If it were the case that there were only concrete and abstract things, we could just
use a contradictory definition of a concrete object. But, Goodman points out that there
seem to be logically consistent things that are neither concrete or abstract. So, because a
negative definition of concretum would be nebulous as to whether it referred to abstract
entities, entities that are neither abstract or concrete, or neither, we must have a positive
definition of abstracta. This is why the definition from Efrid and Stoneham is not suitable
for my position. That is not to say that I necessarily disagree with their definition, but it is
unusable in my argument. Additionally, I do not think that any of Lewis’ definitions will
be satisfactory either. ‘Things like numbers’ and ‘universals’ are more so examples of
abstracta rather than positive definitions. And, my argument requires that abstracta be
able to enter causal relationships.
Goodman, on the other hand, gives a positive definition of abstracta. He states
that things that do not have physical parts are abstract.7 So for any object, if it cannot be
broken into concrete parts, it is abstract. This gives us a good detection device for
abstract entities. We can take the number 4 for example. Then, I can ask, could we
theoretically create a list off all of the atoms that compose the number 4? If it is the case
that we cannot, then the number 4 has no physical parts. And, it is therefore abstract. A
piece of gold, on the other hand, would be concrete because we could theoretically list all
of the physical components that compose it. In short, there are three options, things are
abstract, physical, or neither. And, for anything that cannot be broken down into
comprehensive physical parts, it is abstract.

7

Goodman, N. (1977). Concreta and Qualification. In The Structure of Appearance (pp. 156-177). Boston,
USA: D. Reidel Publishing Company.
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Just because I am committed to Goodman’s definition, however, does not mean
that the other definitions necessarily somehow contradict my position. The Efrid and
Stoneham definition for example, states that physical things have extension and intrinsic
properties. Goodman states that physical things can be broken down completely into their
physical parts. These two definitions do not contradict. Furthermore, nothing about
stating that abstract entities have no physical parts contradicts the position that physical
things have extension and intrinsic properties.
Concerning Lewis’ examples, saying that concretum are like bricks while
abstracta are like numbers fits perfectly into Goodman’s definition because those
examples either can or cannot be broken down into their physical parts respectively.
Next, to say that the abstract/concrete distinction is equivalent to the particular/universal
distinction is to say that in the same way that particulars share in being a part of
universals, concrete objects share in being a part of abstracta.
But, Lewis does include a view in his definitions that may be problematic. If we
were to hold that abstracta cannot be causal, then abstracta cannot function as inputs in
our function. Inputs cause changes in states which lead to events in machine-state
functionalism. If I am to use this function in my ontology, I need abstracta to be in the
causal order of things. But, let us assume that they are not for the sake of the argument. If
we take a modal proposition like, “imagine a possible world where coffee tastes like
roses,” that modal proposition itself cannot be broken into physical parts. By Goodman’s
definition, the proposition itself is abstract. And, if you accept that proposition, you must
accept other propositions too. For example, in accepting that we can imagine a possible
world where coffee tastes like roses, you must also accept that we can imagine a possible
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world where coffee and roses exist. In some sense this abstract proposition has caused
you to accept, or made you realize that you must accept other propositions. Therefore, to
some extent, abstracta must be causally interactive. More logically, If it is an abstract
entity, then it is not causal. Modal propositions themselves cannot be broken into
physical parts. Things that cannot be broken into physical parts are abstract. Therefore,
modal propositions are abstract. I can think of a modal proposition, so it is an abstract
thing. If it is an abstract thing, then that modal proposition cannot be causal. But, if a
modal thing is abstract then it must be causal due to the acceptance of that proposition
causing an acceptance of other propositions. Therefore, according to Lewis’ third
interpretation of abstract entities, they must be causal and not causal at the same time and
in the same respect.
1. ~(E → C)

A

2. M → ~P

A

3. ~P → E

A

4. (M →E) → (E → C)

A

5. M → E

2,3 HS

6. E → C

4,5 MPP

┐ ~(E → C) & (E → C)

1,6 RAA

The above symbolic logic works out to be the following series of statements: It is
not the case that if a thing is an abstract entity then it is causal. If a thing is a modal
proposition, then it does not have physical parts. If a thing does not have physical parts,
then it is an abstract entity. If it is the case that if it is a modal proposition then it is an
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abstract entity, then if it is an abstract entity it is causal. If it is a modal proposition, then
it is an abstract entity. If it is an abstract entity, then it is causal. Therefore, if we assume
the first proposition, it is the case that abstract entities must be both causal and not causal
at the same time and in the same respect.
Functionalism
For the purposes of this thesis, I will be using a form of functionalism closest to
machine functionalism (or machine-state functionalism.) I am not necessarily a
functionalist in the same sense that Machine functionalists are functionalists. I agree with
their idea of what a function is, however, I think machine functionalism should not be
restricted to philosophy of mind. Instead, I argue that it has uses in metaphysics and
ontology. So, I will explain machine functionalism, provide an example, address a
critique that might arise from my using this function, and explain how the application of
this function on ontology and the original view of machine functionalism are compatible.
Essentially, the machine functionalist compares mental states to that of an
instantiated computer program. That is to say, for any brain state that exists there is a
logical function that defines it similar to how a computer program can be defined as a
series of states, inputs, and outputs. For example, a computer can be in an initial state,
statea. Then, inputb changes statea into statec. And, as a result of a change in states because
of inputb, Outputd occurs. This is called a Turing machine. For example, my computer
can be resting on the home screen. Then I give an input of hitting shift five times. This
changes the state of my computer to one where sticky keys is enabled. And, as a result of
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the state change to enabled sticky keys, as a result of my inputs, my computer outputs a
noise.
In terms of philosophy of mind, say I am walking peacefully in a park. Up the
trail, I see someone throw their cigarette butt into the grass. This annoys me for a variety
of different reasons. It is bad for the grass, it could cause a fire, and the pollution will
lower the property value of my nearby house. And, in my annoyed state I yell at the
litterer to pick their trash up. Here, statea is my peacefulness walking through the park.
Inputb is the person throwing their cigarette butt into the grass. Statec is my new annoyed
state as a result of the littering. Finally, outputd is my yelling at the litterer. This is the
machine functionalist account of brain states. They argue that a complete account of the
mind can be given in terms of a Turing machine. Furthermore, the Turing machine
explanation of the mind is able to refer to mental states in an entirely physical way
allowing the machine-state functionalist to posit mental states as physical things. This is
significant for the ontological reason listed above. The machine functionalism is able to
explain reality without the need for a mental type of thing, making their ontology more
efficient.8
One might reply to this, “You are arguing for an abstract ontology. Machine state
functionalism is usually physicalist. You cannot believe in machine state functionalism

8

Guttenplan, Samuel. “Functionalism (1).” In A Companion to the Philosophy of Mind, 318–19. Oxford:
Blackwell, 2004; Putnam, H. (1960). Dimensions of mind A Symposium; Proceedings of the 3rd
annual New York University Inst. of philosophy. In 1270513472 938452983 S. Hook (Author),
Dimensions of mind a symposium; proceedings of the 3rd annual New York University Inst. of
Philosophy (pp. 20-33). New York, NY: N.Y. Univ. Pr.
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and an abstract ontology at the same time.” To that I would reply that I do not necessarily
need to believe machine state functionalism to be true. I believe the function to be useful
in reducing things into abstracta. Both the machine functionalist and I believe that the
function is useful in reduction. But, I place the function at an earlier place in ontology
than they do. Both my ontology and machine state functionalism seek to answer a
question. I am looking to posit what exists. The machine state functionalist looks to posit
how something exists. For this reason, taking the function out of functionalism and
applying it to ontology does not commit me to this version of functionalism. This is
because I am answering a question in a way that is presuppositional to machine state
functionalism.
And, finally, I absolutely can believe in machine state functionalism. Let us
assume that the machine-state functionalist is correct. They believe that mental things
reduce to physical things. I believe that physical things reduce to abstract things. There is
no contradiction here. In fact, if mental things reduce to physical things and physical
things reduce to abstract things, then mental things reduce to abstract things. If anything,
machine-state functionalism helps my ontology reduce not only physical things, but
mental things too. This can be done in the form of a valid syllogism. If mental things can
be entirely explained in physical terms, then they can be reduced to physical things. If
physical things can be entirely explained in abstract terms, then they can be reduced to
abstract things. Therefore, if mental things can be entirely explained in physical terms,
they can be reduced to abstracta.
1. M → P

A

2. P → A

A
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┐ M→A

1,2 HS
Placing Abstracta into the Functional Variables

It has been established that I believe a function can reduce physical things to
abstracta. And, that function consists of states, inputs, and outputs. So, how do the states,
inputs, and outputs apply to an abstract ontology? In other words, how do we assign the
functional variables to an abstract ontology? Each individual variable from machine
functionalism must be applied to something in an abstract ontology. And, with all the
variables in their place, we must be able to perform reductions on objects.
The abstracta are the inputs in this system. A change in input causes a change
state. Likewise, a change in abstracta will change an object in this system. This means
that a state is an object state. More specifically, the object state is all of the properties of
an object at one point in time. It is analogous to the original mental state of peace and the
resulting mental state of frustration in my above example. The object state is influenced
by the different abstracta acting in the function. And, in machine state functionalism,
outputs are events caused by a change of state where that change of state is caused by a
change in input. It is the same here. Real-world events are a result of state changes due to
changes of abstracta.
First, I will reduce a sub-atomic particle. Take a quark, for example, with this
function I can provide a full story of that quark. That is to say, to describe that quark
logically or ontologically, other physical things are not required. A quark can be in be in
any initial state. And, via the strong nuclear force the quark can interact with other
particles. That quark may bond with other quarks via the strong nuclear force. And, as a
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result, a more familiar subatomic particle like an electron is formed. It is important to
note here that the strong nuclear force itself cannot be reduced into a comprehensive list
of its parts. Therefore, it is abstract. Furthermore, we have a function involving this quark
that is analogous to machine functionalism. But, this function has its origins in abstracta.
The quark has an initial state, statea. Then, the strong nuclear force, Inputb causes a state
change. We now have a quark that is binding to other particles, statec. As a result of this
state change, and electron is created, eventd. Finally, this characterizes the quark in terms
of abstract inputs. There is an abstract that disposes a quark to act in a certain way.
Quarks can be discussed without the need for physical inputs or language.
One might reply to this, in one of two ways. First, “How do you know that the
strong nuclear force is not a result of some smaller, physical particle? It seems entirely
possible that this reaction could be physical.” To that I would reply, the same function
would be applicable to the smaller particle, and particles smaller than that, until the either
the smallest, irreducible particle was found, or you would be forced to admit that physical
things are infinitely regressive. Second, “You agreed earlier that physical things are
things that can be comprehensively broken down into their parts. A quark is the smallest
irreducible particle. So, they cannot be an example of a physical thing in your system.
This means that your example does not show that a physical thing is an instantiation of a
machine.” To this I would reply, Goodman’s definition is just a definition. It never
claims to be something like the monad of a quark. The quark still has things like mass
and conductivity. Goodman’ definition is something that guarantees that an object is
physical, not something that encompasses all physical objects.
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Next, the same reduction can be preformed on a macroscopic object. Take the
statue David, for example. Goodman’s definition of concrete objects immediately allows
me to reduce David into all of the quarks composing him because a concrete object is one
that can be comprehensively broken down into its physical parts. From here the same
reduction from above can be used to reduce the subatomic particles composing David
into abstracta. For any one quark in the statue David I can say the following: When said
quark changes from an initial state to a new state, causing a new event to happen, the
process can be described completely in terms of abstract inputs making not only the
quark(s) but also David an instantiation of a Turing machine originating in abstracta.
Therefore, David is also reducible to abstracta.
A mental reduction is a bit more complicated. Initially, it may not seem like a
mental state has any physical pieces and is, therefore, abstract. But, if it is the case that
mental states are reducible to physical things, then those physical things must further be
reduced to abstracta. Take my earlier example. I am peacefully walking down the street
when I see someone litter. Seeing someone litter upsets me. And, as a result I yell at the
litterer. This is a mental state of frustration according to the machine-state functionalist.
And, that mental state is physically reduced. Therefore, each physical piece of that mental
state, my brain, the cigarette butt thrown on the ground, the person littering, etc. can then
be reduced to the individual quarks composing them. From there, just like my first
reduction, each individual quark can be reduced to an abstracta. After the mental has been
reduced to the physical, the physical, cigarette butts, my brain, etc., can be reduced to
quarks and described in terms of abstracta just like the statue David.
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Finally, Goodman posits logically consistent entities that are neither physical nor
abstract. Again, these are tricky because Goodman does not go into great detail about
them. However, in so far as they are true, these must be reduced as well. Goodman does
say that these entities can involve all of the instances of a concretum. So, regardless of
containing whatever color, these instances have physical pieces. Therefore, each object of
the instance can be broken down into quarks with the same reduction applied from any
earlier example.
Whither Physical Objects
Quine seems to be of a similar state of mind in his essay Whither Physical
Objects. He states that the only tenable version of a region in space-time is a fourdimensional one. Or, a region of space-time that can be located by four numbered
coordinates, presumably three spatial coordinates and one temporal one. And, that objects
do not take up these regions in space-time but are, in fact, the regions of spacetime
themselves.9
As a result, Quine states that sooner or later we must be forced to introduce things
like numbers into our ontology. These numbers account for the varying degrees of
motion, temperature, etc. that our physical objects can be in. In other words, to describe
the average temperature of the human body as 98.6 degrees Fahrenheit, we must first
have numbers as an accepted entity in our ontology. And, we have four-dimensional

9

Quine, W. (1976). Whither Physical Objects? In 1274612785 941041098 R. S. Cohen, 1274612786
941041098 P. Feyerabend, & 1274612787 941041098 M. W. Wartofsky (Authors), Essays in
memory of Imre Lakatos (pp. 497-504). Dordrecht: Reidel.
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coordinates to describe the location of every point in a region of spacetime. So, numbers
can completely describe a physical objects location and state of being. Physical objects
are reduced to mathematics and abstracta entities. And, mathematics and abstract entities
are further reduced to set theory.10
I believe this to be similar because both Quine and I have a picture of physical
objects that dissolve into the abstract components that describe or compose them. Quine
might even be using a similar methodology here. He discusses state changes of objects as
a result of his abstract entities in a similar way to how machine functionalism poses state
changes due to inputs. The biggest difference here is that Quine finds no comfort in the
volatility of sub-atomic particles. He believes that it is problematic to view volatile
particles as changes in state as it is hard to say whether an electron or quark persists over
time.
Ockham’s Razor
To evaluate a view like this we must use the tools I mentioned earlier. First, I
would like to clarify the difference between properties and entities. Next, I will evaluate
the parsimony of my view using Ockham’s and Russell’s razors. Finally, I will discuss
the merits on monism is Ockham’s razor.
The overarching goal of this paper is to explain as much as possible with as little
types of entities as possible. With that being said, Physical things still have physical
properties in my system. A house, even though it is reducible to abstracta, still has

10

Ibid, 497-504
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extension in a way that a singular abstracta does not. It is important for me to say that
properties do not equal entities. Just because something may retain physical properties
does not mean that it is irreducible to abstract entities. In traditional machine-state
functionalism, properties of the mind like remembering and thinking are still mental
properties, but mental states are physical things. This carries over to my reductions.
Physical things can have properties like extension while still being abstract things.
Nothing about the retention of properties affects the reduction of objects.
The maxim, ‘Do not multiply types of entities beyond necessity.’ is the driving
rule behind this project. It is the rubric by which my paper can be considered successful.
With that being said, how did I do? We began by accepting that there are three types of
entities, concrete objects, abstracta, and entities that are neither concrete nor abstract.
And, entities that are concrete and entities that are neither concrete nor abstract are
analogous to an instantiated Turing machine originating in abstracta. Therefore, they can
be reduced to abstracta. Additionally, if one were to assume that mental states were their
own entities, those too can be reduced to abstracta via being first reduced to physical
things. We are, therefore, left with only one type of entity, abstracta. This is a very
beneficial place to be in ontologically. Because, if I can explain everything only using
one type of entity, then my view is inherently more efficient than an ontology that
requires more entities. And, the more efficient a view the more likely it is correct.
A critic might reply, “How do you know that you have all of your types of entities
accounted for? Couldn’t there be something outside of the entities listed?” To that I
would reply that it seems like Goodman’s list of entity types is exhaustive. The
proposition, ‘There are entities that are neither concrete nor abstract.’ does not
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necessarily only refer to one type of entity. It refers to everything in number and type that
is neither concrete nor abstract. Therefore, abstract, concrete, and neither/nor is complete
in its account of types of entities. Goodman only posits one type of logically consistent
entity that is neither abstract nor concrete. And, that type of entity can be accounted for in
my system. With that being said, a logically consistent type of entity that is different from
Goodman’s example may serve as a counterexample.
Furthermore, Russel’s version of Ockham’s razor essentially states that given a
lack of sufficient evidence, no entity should be inferred. And, in taking my functionalist
approach to Ontology I have demonstrated the lack of sufficient evidence for entities that
are not abstract. In other words, the reduction of things to abstracta demonstrates a lack
of sufficient evidence that those things have a fundamental place in our reality. And, as a
result, our ontologies should not accept those things as fundamental.
Flaws, and Replies
This view may not be without complications, however. I would like to discuss a
potential flaw in my ontology and provide a reply attempting to ameliorate it. The
potential problem stems from set theory and the potential of the abstract entities in my
system to further reduce to sets.
If it is the case that the abstracta in my system are further reducible to sets, then
my overarching claim that the ultimate constituents of reality are abstract is unaffected.
Sets themselves are also abstract. Therefore, if it is the case that abstracta in my system
are further reducible to sets, the ultimate constituents of reality are still abstract. With that
being set, set theory may make this ontological functionalism superfluous. If it is the case
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that my ontology can ultimately be reduced to sets without the use of my function, then
the function seems useless, and I am ultimately just a hyper-Pythagorean.
If it is the case that physical objects can be more efficiently reduced to sets, then
the function by which I claim things are reduced would be useless for reductive purposes.
But, the claim that physical things are instances of Turing machines originating in
abstract would still be true. And, this claim is significant whether or not the function is
proper for ontological reductions. From the claim that physical things are instantiations of
Turing machines I could claim that the reduction to abstracta is a logical implication. But,
I could not claim that the ontological function itself is what reduces physical things to
abstracta.
If you will recall, however, in Goodman’s system sets are unreliable abstracta to
serve as building blocks. We can construct a set based on the properties of objects in
which some members of the set do not have similar properties. In other words, if we
accept that sets are the fundamental things of reality, it is possible for a set to be
organized based on properties and not based on properties at the same time and in the
same respect.
Logical Implications
I have already discussed that some may find this view strange. And, that the
strangeness is not a flaw. Below, I will discuss a strange logical implication of this view.
In doing so, I intend to be as honest as possible with the results of my ontology.

Farlow 23
A strange implication of this view is that quarks seem to be the only physical
things. Everything else that we would consider physical is just a physical event as a result
of state changes in quarks. That means I, as a person, am not really a physical thing in the
same way that a quark is considered physical. I am not saying here that quarks are a
fundamental entity in reality, but rather that they are the only things that can be
considered physical in a traditional common-sense version of the word. And, if not
quarks, then the smallest particle that composes physical things are. Something like a
dog, is instead a physical event caused by changes in atoms.
Furthermore, quarks are reducible to abstracta. Therefore, since I am a
composition of quarks, and those quarks are a composition of abstracta, I just seem to be
an abstract state-of-affairs. By this, I mean that I am the way in which certain abstracta
are currently acting. The things composed of quarks just seem to be events because of the
quarks while those same quarks are reducible to abstracta. Therefore, I am an instantiated
event of abstracta.
Conclusion
The questions and methods for evaluation in ontology support an idea that
abstracta are the fundamental substance of reality. That is to say, that when I use a
machine-state function to show that physical objects, mental states, and objects that are
neither abstract nor physical are instances of a Turing machine originating in abstracta, I
show that the function also reduces those things to abstracta. I am left with a streamlined
view of reality.
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Through explaining the question of ontology, defending ‘strange’ views of reality,
discussing and defining abstracta, explaining machine functionalism and how its
variables fit into abstracta, reducing physical objects to abstracta, and applying Ockham’s
and Russell’s razors, I believe I have created an ontology that is successful in its
efficiency and valid in its structure.
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